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Abstract 
While the endorsement of universalistic values by the New Left led to a first 
transformation of political space in Western Europe, the counter-mobilization of the 
extreme populist right resulted in a second transformation in the 1990s. This article 
focuses on the discursive innovations and normative foundations that have driven the 
emergence of a conflict opposing libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-
communitarian values. An analysis using data from the media coverage of election 
campaigns confirms that the New Left and the populist right represent polar 
normative ideals in France, Austria, and Switzerland. A similar transformation of 
political space occurred in the absence of a right-wing populist party in Germany, 
Britain, and the Netherlands. In these contexts, I hypothesize the value conflict to 
prove less durable and polarizing in the longer run. The analysis of an election in the 
mid-2000s confirms that party systems evolve in a path dependent manner in the two 
contexts. 
 
 
 
In the past decades, new cultural conflicts have become vastly prominent in West 
European politics. While the New Social Movements of the left first advocated 
universalistic values in the late 1960s of the past century, a New Right counter-
movement that has gained momentum some two decades later. First resulting in the 
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fading of established partisan loyalties, these new conflicts have been represented by 
political parties. In this article, I focus on the programmatic innovations of parties and 
the consequent reshaping of the conflicts represented by party systems at the turn of 
the century. Furthermore, I assess how durable conflicts centring on cultural 
liberalism, immigration policies, and European integration are likely to be. In this 
respect, persisting differences in the nature of conflicts in different countries are to be 
expected as a result of the way cultural conflicts transformed party systems early on.  
The theoretical part of this article provides an account of how New Left and New 
Right parties have driven the emergence of a new value conflict. The first 
transformation, which took place in the 1970s, involved the emergence of an 
opposition between culturally libertarian and traditionalist or authoritarian values. In a 
second transformation, this conflict has come to centre more explicitly on differing 
conceptions of community. In normative terms, I argue that libertarian-universalistic 
and traditionalist-communitarian values form opposing normative ideals and 
conceptions of justice. Empirically, these two conceptions come to lie at opposing 
poles of a new dimension of political conflict in West European party systems in the 
1990s. With reference to the non-economic content of this dimension, I will refer to it 
as the new cultural divide. With the traditional distributional conflict well and alive, 
this results in a two-dimensional competitive space. In France, Switzerland, and 
Austria, extreme right-wing populist parties have triggered the manifestation of the 
new cultural divide, while it has emerged as a result of the strategic moves of the 
established parties in Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands. Whether or not a right-
wing populist party was able to entrench itself in the crucial phase of the late-1980s or 
early-1990s has important implications for the durability and for the virulence of the 
new cultural conflict, however. 
These claims are empirically verified in an analysis of the dimensionality of 
political space in the 1970s, the 1990s, and the first years of the new millennium. This 
inquiry relies on data on party positions derived from the news coverage of election 
campaigns. This article extends earlier analyses (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008) to a more 
recent election in each of the six countries, and allows parties and issues to be located 
in the political space by means of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). Using this data, I 
investigate how the dimensions underlying political competition have evolved 
between the 1970s and the mid-2000s.(1) This allows me to assess, first, how resilient 
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the cultural conflicts will prove, and second, to verify the frequent claim that they are 
likely to be integrated into the traditional left-right dimension.  
The article is structured as follows. After a brief discussion of the forces 
underlying recent evolutions in West European party systems, I focus on the 
ideologies that parties have used to mobilize the new cultural conflict. Section two 
develops hypotheses on how the new conflicts are likely to manifest themselves in the 
transformation of political space, depending on the context of the national party 
system. I then present the research design and the data used in the empirical analysis, 
the results of which are presented in the final section. The analysis will allow an over-
time tracking of the two-fold transformation of political space. Given the postulated 
divergence between party systems in the 2000s, and because this data has hitherto not 
been analyzed, I will put special emphasis on the patterns of opposition in the most 
recent contest. 
 
The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe 
There is some disagreement regarding the sources of the recent transformations of 
West European party systems. As pointed out by Enyedi and Deegan-Krause in the 
introduction to this issue, parallel to the dealignment of traditional class and religious 
cleavages, there are also processes of realignment that are driven by new structural 
antagonisms. As pointed out by Allardt (1968) early on, the educational revolution of 
the 1960s has spurred a growing diffusion of universalistic outlooks that citizens with 
more traditionalist values and conceptions of community are likely to see as 
threatening. On the other hand, Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) argue that the educational 
revolution interacts with processes of denationalization or globalization to create 
“winners” and “losers” of the modernization processes of the past decades (on these 
two views see also the contributions by Dolezal and by Stubager, this issue).  
One may debate the relative contribution of economic modernization, spurred by 
globalization, and cultural modernization since the late 1960s in party system change. 
As a result of these evolutions certain social groups have lost in terms of life-chances 
or privileges, while others feel threatened in their identity by the policies enacting 
universalistic values and by European integration. One of the most striking outcomes 
of these large-scale changes has been that the resulting political potentials have at 
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least until recently not been mobilized in economic terms. Rather, they have been tied 
to cultural conflicts that emerged in the aftermath of 1968. In this contribution, I leave 
the evolving structural underpinnings of party choices in Western Europe aside for the 
moment. Instead, I focus on the political conflicts themselves that have triggered these 
processes of dealignment and realignment. If cleavages involve social structural 
groups with shared identities that allow them to act collectively, as defined by 
Bartolini and Mair (1990), then ideologies are likely to play a dual role from a 
cleavage perspective. On the one hand, conflict along established divisions keeps 
alive existing collective identities and thereby perpetuates alignments between social 
groups and parties. Novel ideologies, on the other hand, are crucial in the political 
articulation of new potentials rooted in an evolving social structure. Common social 
structural positions are unlikely to result in collective identifications as a matter of 
course. Instead, the latter are to some degree shaped from above by political actors 
that seek to establish durable links between themselves and segments of society 
(Bornschier forthcoming a). 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, new political issues came up that had more to do with 
values and life-styles than with traditional, distributional conflicts. The mobilization 
of the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s – fighting, for example, for 
feminist and gay rights, for the right to abortion and for the recognition of minorities 
and alternative life-styles – brought these new issues onto the political agenda, 
resulting in a two-dimensional structure in West European party systems, as Kitschelt 
(1994) has shown. Cutting across the “old” distributional axis, a cultural line of 
conflict opposing libertarian and authoritarian values had come to structure the 
attitudes of voters. On the political left, the prominence of cultural liberalism has 
given rise to the establishment of Ecologist parties and a transformation of a number 
of Social Democratic parties early on in the 1980s.  
An opposing set of norms and values that constituted a counter-potential to the 
libertarian movements was detectable at the attitudinal level early on in Western 
publics (Sacchi 1998). Its political manifestation, however, was delayed as compared 
to that of the New Left. The discomfort with the cultural changes brought about by the 
New Left was essentially conservative, and ideologically diffuse (see also Flanagan 
and Lee 2003). Consequently, the political manifestation of the anti-universalistic 
potential was less the result of a grass-roots mobilization in social movements, as had 
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been the case for the New Left, but depended more heavily on political leadership. In 
particular, political actors had to find specific issues around which a common identity 
could be established and that could serve to mobilize the traditionalist potential. In the 
1990s, right-wing populist parties in a number of European countries succeeded in 
putting themes on the political agenda that disrupted older collective identities based 
on class and religion. This is important since the mobilization space of new conflicts 
is conditioned by the political identities tied to the established cleavages (Bornschier 
forthcoming a). As a consequence, and despite their diverse origins, right-wing 
populist parties have converged on a programmatic profile that involves two 
elements: First, they challenge the societal changes brought about by the libertarian 
left, and question the legitimacy of political decisions that enact universalistic values. 
Second, and more importantly, the populist right has promoted new issues and 
developed new discourses, for example concerning immigration. This does not 
involve ethnic racism, but rather what Betz (2004) and Betz and Johnson (2004) have 
called “differentialist nativism” or “cultural differentialism”, which represents a 
counter-vision to multicultural models of society.  
The early literature emphasized the diversity of ideological appeals of parties of 
the extreme right (e.g., Kitschelt and McGann 1995), and while some of these 
differences can be shown to persist (e.g., Golder 2003, Carter 2005, Cole 2005, 
Mudde 2007), the successful exponents of this group have converged on the 
programmatic profile outlined above. By virtue of their specific programmatic profile, 
as well a number of further attributes, extreme right-wing populist parties represent a 
common party family that forms an ideologically more moderate sub-group of the 
broader extreme right category (Bornschier forthcoming a).(2) While the New Left 
has triggered a first transformation of political space in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
mobilization of the populist right has thus been the driving force of a second 
transformation. Depending on the country, the latter took place either in the late 1980s 
or in the 1990s, as the analysis will show (see also Kriesi et al. 2006).  
As a result, the issues advocated by the New Left and the populist right now lie at 
opposing poles of a new line of conflict that I propose to label libertarian-
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian.(3) This opposition is, at heart, a 
conflict over the role of community. It is at the centre of the well-known 
philosophical debate between liberals and communitarians, opposing individualist and 
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communitarian conceptions of the person. As communitarians such as Walzer (1983) 
and Taylor (1992) argue, universalistic principles may violate cultural traditions 
within an established community. If humans are inherently social beings, the 
application of universalistic principles may lead to political solutions that clash with 
established and widely shared cultural practices. Communitarians urge us to 
acknowledge the fact that our identities are grounded in cultural traditions, and that an 
individualistic conception of the self is misconceived.  
Although many communitarian thinkers only propose a (more or less modest) 
communitarian corrective to liberal universalism, this debate has provided theoretical 
grounds for a more far-reaching critique of the universalistic principles advocated by 
Rawls (1971). Philosophical currents of the European New Right have borrowed from 
communitarian conceptions of community and justice in their propagation of the 
concept of “cultural differentialism”, claiming not the superiority of any nationality or 
race, but instead stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions. 
In turn, this discourse has proved highly influential for right-wing populist parties 
(Antonio 2000, Minkenberg 2000, Birnbaum 1996). Immigration is directly linked to 
this conception since the inflow of people from other cultural backgrounds endangers 
the cultural homogeneity that thinkers of the New Right, as well as exponents of 
right-wing populist parties deem necessary to preserve. Equally present in 
communitarian thinking and in the discourse of the populist right is a defence of the 
primacy of democratic majority decisions over abstract normative principles. From a 
theoretical point of view, then, New Left and New Right positions represent polar 
normative ideals.(4) Empirically, I therefore expect the defence of cultural tradition 
and the rejection of multicultural society to form one pole of the new cultural divide 
in political space, while cultural liberalism and universalistic conceptions of 
community constitute the opposing pole. 
 
The Advent of a Two-Dimensional Political Space: Hypotheses 
Many European countries have been stamped by more than just the state-market 
cleavage, most notably the religious cleavage that has represented the second common 
structuring element of European party systems. Consequently, political space in 
multiparty systems may well have been two-dimensional already before the New Left 
7 
transformation of social democratic parties. Flanagan and Lee (2003) explicitly relate 
today’s “culture wars” to an opposition between religious and increasingly secular 
and individualistic worldviews. More than the advent of a fundamentally new 
dimension of conflict, then, we are likely to have witnessed a shift in the substantive 
content of the cultural or religious dimension, and of the relative salience of the 
economic and cultural divides. In the 1970s, where the empirical analysis will begin, I 
expect a situation in which the cultural issues put on the agenda by the New Left have 
resulted in a first restructuring of political space, leading to a divide between 
libertarian and authoritarian or traditionalist values. As a consequence of the 
emergence of a communitarian conception of community opposed to the universalistic 
one, I expect this divide to have been transformed anew in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, resulting in an opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-
communitarian values.  
Although parties of the established right first put the issue of immigration on the 
political agenda in the 1980s, as pointed out by Ignazi (1992, 2003), only right-wing 
populist parties practice an elaborate traditionalist-communitarian discourse that 
combines opposition against universalistic values with an exclusionist conception of 
community. Consequently, while the immigration issue has been a prominent one in 
most of Western Europe in the 1990s, resulting in a commonality of the party political 
space (see Bornschier 2005 and Kriesi et al. 2006), I expect party systems with a 
significant right-wing populist party to follow a different trajectory in the 2000s than 
party systems where this has not been the case. The reason is that a firmly entrenched 
right-wing populist party can keep questions of community and tradition on the 
political agenda, while they may lose in importance otherwise. Where the established 
parties were able to avert the entry of a party of the populist right, economic issues 
may thus make a comeback, partly due to unpopular reforms of the welfare state 
pursued by left-wing parties in government. A position of economic protectionism 
seems to convey considerable potential for parties off the left-wing mainstream. Apart 
from Germany, the recent success of the Socialist Party in the Netherlands also fits 
this pattern.  
Consequently, we can expect differences in the lines of conflict that structure 
political space that stem from the configuration of the party system. But the resulting 
dimensionality of political space is open to yet another source of variation. If voter 
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preferences are more than one-dimensional, then the dimensionality of the party 
political space will depend on the specific way parties combine positions along the 
relevant lines of conflict (see also Stoll’s analysis of “raw” and “effective” party-
defined spaces, this issue). If party positions along the cultural line of conflict were to 
coincide with their stances regarding the state-market cleavage, a one-dimensional 
political space would emerge. The more party positions on the two dimensions 
diverge, on the other hand, the more strongly two-dimensional the resulting political 
space will be.  
 
Research Design 
The ensuing analysis focuses on six countries, namely, France, Switzerland, Austria, 
the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. These countries differ with respect to many 
institutional, societal and political characteristics, such as their size or regarding their 
political institutions. For all these differences, I expect similar cultural conflicts to 
have asserted themselves since the late-1960s due to social changes characteristic of 
advanced industrial countries. Consequently, we should be able to witness a similar 
two-fold transformation of political space. The analysis starts by looking at 1970s 
elections in the six countries, where I expect the first transformation to have occurred. 
I then move to the first election in the late-1980s or early-1990s for which data is 
available in order to trace the second transformation. Despite the basic commonality 
of the development in the six countries, I also expect differences between them. The 
party system filters the mobilization of political potentials, and different actors are 
likely to be the driving forces of the transformations. This is likely to have 
implications for the capacity of the cultural divide to “freeze” party systems, and the 
six countries present some interesting variation in this respect: A new party of the 
populist right has emerged in France, Switzerland and Austria, but not in Germany, 
the Netherlands, or Britain. Fresh data from the most recent election in each country 
serves to assess whether conflicts evolve differently in these two contexts. 
To identify the lines of conflict structuring political competition, I use media data 
based on an analysis of parties’ “political offer” in election campaigns. In each 
country, all articles related to the electoral contest or politics in general were selected 
from a quality newspaper and a tabloid, covering the last two months before Election 
Day. These newspapers analyzed are Die Presse and Kronenzeitung in Austria, Le 
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Monde and le Parisien for France, NRC Handelsblad and Algemeen Dagblad in the 
Netherlands, Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Blick for Switzerland, Süddeutsche Zeitung 
and Bild in Germany, and The Times and The Sun in Britain. The articles were coded 
sentence-by-sentence using a method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his colleagues 
(see Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; for a fuller description of the coding 
procedure and data used for the present article, see Dolezal 2008). The choice of this 
data has advantages as well as disadvantages. Newspapers often have a specific 
partisan bias, and may give more room to some contenders and less to others. This 
would above all be a problem for an analysis based exclusively on issue saliency, 
however. Partisan bias is far less problematic for the coding scheme used here, which 
determines party positions in terms of a positive or negative direction of parties 
concerning issues. The data predominantly captures statements that party exponents 
make at press conferences and on other occasions, and it is unlikely that newspapers 
twist these statements to a degree that affects the validity of the measurement.  
The advantages of this data over expert survey data are clear. Because small 
political formations such as right-wing populist parties may not have marked profiles 
concerning all issue dimensions, expert surveys risk to produce data that is biased by 
theoretical expectations regarding parties’ positions. An obvious disadvantage of the 
campaign data compared to that based on manifestoes (Budge et al. 2001, 
Klingemann et al. 2006) is that is covers only a relatively limited time-span. There is 
an important advantage over both alternative data sources, however, being that the 
campaign data more closely reflects what voters actually learn of the parties’ 
positions. The data is therefore more situational, which is advantageous for the scope 
of this analysis. Because the populist right has succeeded in setting the media agenda 
in recent years, it has forced even those parties to take positions regarding 
immigration and traditionalist-communitarian values that were more occupied with 
other issues. In these cases, deriving positional measures from saliency is potentially 
misleading. Hence, the media data offer information both on the position of parties 
regarding issues, as well as on their relative salience. Using Weighted Metric 
Multidimensional Scaling, both are taken into account to create graphical 
representations of political space.  
The political issues put forward by parties in these campaigns are regrouped into 
12 broader categories that relate to the research questions at hand. In the following, 
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the content of these categories is specified. All categories have a clear direction, and 
actor’s stance towards them can be either positive or negative. The abbreviations in 
brackets refer to the ones used in the figures later on: 
 
Economic issues 
- Welfare: Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state 
retrenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment and health 
care programs. 
- Budget: Budgetary rigor and tax reductions that have no redistributive effects. 
- Economic liberalism (ecolib): Opposition to market regulation, support for 
deregulation, for more competition, and privatisation. 
 
Cultural issues 
- Cultural liberalism (cultlib): Support for the goals of the New Social Movements: 
Peace, solidarity with the third world, gender equality, human rights. Support for 
cultural diversity and international cooperation. Opposition to racism, support for 
the right to abortion and euthanasia, for a liberal drug policy etc. The category 
includes the opposite concept of cultural protectionism, coded inversely: 
Patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence of tradition and national 
sovereignty, traditional moral values. 
- Europe: Support for European integration (including enlargement) or EU-
membership in the case of Switzerland and Austria prior to 1995. 
- Culture: Support for education, culture, and scientific research. 
- Immigration: Support for a tough immigration and integration policy, and for the 
restriction of the number of foreigners. 
- Army: Support for a strong national defence and for nuclear weapons. 
- Security: Support for more law and order, fight against criminality. 
 
Residual categories 
- Environment (eco): Calls for environmental protection, opposition to atomic 
energy. 
- Institutional reform (iref): Support for various institutional reforms such as the 
extension of direct democratic rights or calls for the efficiency of the public 
administration. 
- Infrastructure (infra): Support for the improvement of the infrastructure. 
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The grouping of the issues into economic, cultural, and residual categories is 
provided for illustrative purposes only and does not determine the analysis. The 
distances between parties and issue categories are analysed separately for each 
country and for each election using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). The MDS 
technique first assesses how many dimensions are necessary to represent the parties 
and issues, using as few dimensions as possible. Having determined the 
dimensionality, the method then represents objects graphically according to the 
proximity between them (see Coxon 1982, Rabinowitz 1975). It is important to note 
that the only information conveyed in the resulting configurations is the relative 
proximity between objects (i.e., the absolute distances in the figures cannot be 
compared). The solution can be freely rotated, and the configurations shown in the 
following section have been arranged to make the antagonism between state and 
market to lie horizontally in political space. While it is possible to lay axes into the 
solution in order to more easily grasp what the main conflicts are about, the 
representations do not lend themselves to a dimensional interpretation. This is because 
the location of parties results from their positions regarding all relevant issue 
categories. To give an example, parties of the New Left may not lie exactly next to the 
cultural liberalism category because their position regarding the distributional state-
market conflict “pulls” them in a different direction. There are thus always distortions 
between the “real” distances and their graphical representation in the political space. 
Employing Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling ensures, however, that the 
distances with respect to salient issues or parties will be more accurate than less 
salient ones. While it is intuitively plausible that the representation of the competitive 
political space should mirror the most salient conflicts in the party system, this 
procedure has one drawback: Parties may misleadingly be located in proximity to 
issues they are not in favour of, but did not strongly voice an opinion on, because 
these distances will play a minor role in determining the political space resulting from 
MDS. For these reasons, it is indispensable occasionally to refer to the original, 
undistorted distances in the data on which the MDS-analysis is based. Tables 
indicating the party positions and issue saliency can be found in the Appendix. Note 
that certain issues and parties are dropped from the analysis due to their limited 
presence in the media, and thus do not appear in the figures. 
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The Stress-I statistic, which is indicated below Figures 1 to 6, is a measure of 
badness-of-fit. The closer this value is to zero, the better the low-dimensional 
representation fits the original data. There are no generally applicable rules as to what 
constitutes an acceptable fit, not least because the graphical representation of political 
space is always a simplification of a more complex reality. While the goodness-of-fit 
may vary from one election to another, MDS does tell us reliably how many 
dimensions are necessary to represent political space.  
 
The Transformation of West European Political Space from the 1970s to 
the mid-2000s 
In all elections under study, political space proves to be clearly two-dimensional, 
since the move from a one-dimensional to a two-dimensional representation results in 
the clearest improvement in the goodness-of-fit of the solution. A constant finding 
across countries and elections is that an antagonism between welfare provision and 
economic liberalism emerges as the political manifestation of the state-market 
cleavage forms one of these dimensions. While the traditional distributive conflict 
thus remains polarizing – or indeed in many instances has become more polarized 
than was the case in the 1970s –, the second dimension of opposition in political space 
has been subject to change. In the following, I focus primarily on this transformation. 
Because the results reveal a common evolution in terms of the impact of cultural 
conflicts on political space from the 1970s to the 1990s, but a divergence thereafter, I 
present figures that present a cross-sectional view of political space at three time-
points, namely, the mid-1970s, the late-1980s or early-1990s, and the 2000s. For 
reasons of space, I will focus rather narrowly on the core hypotheses advanced in the 
theoretical section and omit a discussion of the location of the other issue categories 
and less relevant parties. 
In the 1970s, cultural liberalism, which regroups the issues relating to the goals of 
the New Social Movements, has appeared on the political agenda, as Figures 1 and 2 
show. The libertarian-universalistic pole of the new cultural divide already structures 
party positions in all six countries. Except for Switzerland, this category occupies a 
rather extreme position, which is an indicator of polarization. Generally, Socialist or 
Social Democrat parties of the left most strongly endorse these goals, indicating that 
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they have undergone a New Left transformation. This is the case of the PSF in France, 
the SPD in Germany, the SPÖ in Austria, and to a more limited degree of the Labour 
Party in Britain. While the Dutch PvdA occupies a similar position, it already faces 
competition from new parties mobilizing universalistic values, namely the Green-Left 
party and D66. The entry of competitors within the New Left has thus occurred early 
in the Netherlands, but the other countries have followed suit, as we shall see later. 
Finally, in Germany, the SPD’s liberal democrat coalition partner occupies a position 
in similar vicinity to cultural liberalism and the same is true of the Christian 
Democrats in Switzerland.  
 
Figures 1 & 2 about here 
 
Depending on the country, the counter-pole of the cultural dimension is formed 
either by budgetary rigor, support for the army, or by law and order stances 
(“security”), or by a combination of these. The antagonism between cultural 
liberalism and budgetary rigor may be interpreted as a neo-conservative anti-state 
position, which is liberal in economic terms and traditionalist in cultural matters (see 
Habermas 1985, Eatwell 1989). Support for the army or law and order, on the other 
hand, reflects a traditionalist or authoritarian position that is in line with the 
expectations set out regarding the nature of the cultural divide in the 1970s. 
Conservative parties lie closest to the authoritarian or traditionalist pole, most clearly 
in the cases of the CDU in Germany and the Gaullist RPR in France. In the 
Netherlands, the liberal VVD and CDA lie furthest away from cultural liberalism, but 
their traditionalist position is less clear-cut than in the countries just discussed, and the 
same is true of the Conservatives in Britain. Note that in both countries, there is an 
issue category that lies even further away than security, but this is not due to strong 
polarization, but rather to the fact that all parties reject European integration in the 
British and a strong army in the Dutch case (see the party positions in the Appendix). 
Finally, and interestingly, the two parties that later underwent a transformation to a 
right-wing populist party already in the 1970s lie at the traditionalist pole of the 
cultural divide. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is staunchly anti-universalistic and 
culturally conservative, and the same is true of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). 
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The Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) takes a much more centrist position compared to 
the FPÖ. While both the mainstream left and right in Austria are clearly situated on 
the left of the state-market cleavage, they differ not only with respect to cultural 
liberalism, but also due to the ÖVP’s calls for budgetary rigor and cutting back the 
state.  
A second transformation of political space occurs between the 1970s and the 1990s 
as a result of the redefinition of the cultural dimension of conflict, as Figures 3 and 4 
show.(5) The appearance of the immigration issue on the political agenda marks the 
emergence of a full-fledged opposition between libertarian-universalistic and 
traditionalist-communitarian values in every country but Britain, where a 
configuration typical of the 1970s continues to prevail. In some countries, this results 
in an antagonism between the New Left and the populist right, while in others, 
established conservative parties are situated rather close to the traditionalist-
communitarian pole of the new cultural divide. I start off by discussing those cases 
where a right-wing populist party drove the transformation, and indeed also stood to 
benefit most from it.  
 
Figures 3 about here 
 
In France, the mainstream right backed off from its resistance against libertarian-
universalistic values, and together with the Front National’s programmatic innovation, 
this has resulted in the populist right replacing the mainstream right as the antagonist 
of the New Left. In Switzerland and Austria, established parties have come to adopt a 
profile similar to that of the Front National. Both the Austrian Freedom Party and the 
Swiss People’s Party are situated at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of the 
transformed cultural dimension. In Switzerland, the SVP is located close to the 
various smaller parties of the extreme right parties, which in this election still gained a 
sizable share of the vote. Competing with a better-funded party and a charismatic 
leader, the electoral fate of the extreme right parties was dull after the SVP’s 
exploitation of the themes of European integration and immigration. After their high 
in 1991, they virtually collapsed under the mobilization efforts of the SVP. Similarly 
to the Swiss case, Jörg Haider’s FPÖ adopted a hierarchical internal organization and 
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a strong anti-establishment discourse, which allowed him to capitalize first on 
economic liberalism and later on the questions of immigration and identity. Among 
the parties studied in this article, the Front National, the SVP, and the FPÖ thus 
qualify as members of the extreme right-wing populist party family (for a more 
detailed discussion, see Bornschier forthcoming a). 
In all of these cases, the mainstream competitors of the populist right have reacted 
to the latter’s success by taking up some of its core issues and positions. In France, 
this has leaded the Gaullist RPR and the UDF to adopt an incoherent profile that 
combines an endorsement of universalistic values with restrictive immigration stances 
(see Appendix). This results in their centrist position in Figure 3. The Swiss liberals 
pursue a similar strategy due to the substantial voter shares they have lost to the SVP 
as a consequence of the prominence of the new cultural conflict. In neither case did 
this prevent the success of the extreme populist right, however, which relies on a 
much more coherent traditionalist-communitarian ideology. Clearly, then, right-wing 
populist parties are not single-issue parties that thrive solely on the immigration issue, 
as Mudde (1996) has argued some time ago ago, and contrary to what Ivarsflaten’s 
(2008) asserts. The similar effort of the Social Democrats and the ÖVP in Austria to 
adopt not only tougher stances on immigration, but also calls for law and order, has 
not contained the FPÖ’s success either. Rather, participation in government has been 
detrimental to the populist right in Austria. The results shown in Figure 3 indicate that 
the ÖVP and the FPÖ differ rather strongly with respect to their state-market position. 
The ÖVP’s ability to force the FPÖ into a rather liberal economic policy, which goes 
against the preferences of the latter’s core constituencies, goes part of the way in 
explaining the FPÖ’s subsequent losses.  
The Swiss configuration is a partial exception to the pattern found in France and 
Austria due to the extraordinary role that conflicts over Europe has played in the 1991 
election, one year before the referendum regarding membership in the European 
Economic Area. Its staunch opposition against European integration has catalyzed the 
success of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), and in this election, Europe forms the 
counter-pole to traditionalism and communitarianism. Cultural liberalism lies at a 
similar distance from the immigration category, but the antagonism formed by these 
two issues runs parallel and therefore overlaps completely with the state-market 
dimension. The fact that support for European integration and cultural liberalism do 
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not go hand-in-hand, as we would expect, is due to the fact that European integration 
faced opposition both from the populist right and from the Ecologists in this election. 
Despite their clearly libertarian-universalistic profile, the Swiss Greens initially 
opposed forging closer bonds with the EU because they were concerned that this 
would dilute Switzerland’s achievements in environmental protection. This has also 
led members of this party family in Scandinavia to oppose European integration (Jahn 
1999, Johansson and Raunio 2001). In later elections, however, the Swiss Ecologists 
rallied behind a pro-European position in the later contests, and the Swiss 
configuration comes to resemble the continental European mainstream, as we shall 
see. 
As mentioned, the British political space in the early-1990s, shown in Figure 4, 
still resembles that of the 1974 election due to the absence of the immigration issue. 
In the two other countries that have not seen successful right-wing populist 
challengers, on the other hand, a transformation of political space similar to that in 
France, Austria, and Switzerland has occurred. This is consequent of the adoption of 
the immigration issue by established parties of the right, similarly to what had already 
occurred in the early 1980s (Ignazi 2003). Confronted with large numbers of migrants 
and refugees from Eastern Europe and former Yugoslavia, and with a wave of 
extreme right activism and violence, the German Union parties argued that the 
“threshold of tolerance” and of the capacity to assimilate foreigners had been reached. 
While calling for a more restrictive immigration policy, the Union’s position is 
somewhat less extreme than that of the populist right in other countries, and not that 
different from that of the Social Democrats. The latter have clearly abandoned the 
universalistic position they had held in the seventies. In the German case, the resulting 
centripetal pattern of competition between the two major parties contained the 
salience of the immigration issue, and helped to inhibit the emergence of a right-wing 
populist party (Bornschier forthcoming a). In the Netherlands, the VVD is both most 
distant from cultural liberalism and most strongly calls for a tough immigration 
policy. While its remote position with respect to the other parties leaves little space 
for a right-wing populist competitor, this strategy did contribute to keeping the 
immigration issue on the political agenda. The cultural divide thus remained virulent 
in later elections, contributing to Pim Fortuyn’s success in 2002.  
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Figure 4 about here 
 
In all six countries, parties of the New Left continue to occupy the libertarian-
universalistic pole of the new divide. Staying true to their universalistic convictions, 
the rejection of the tough immigration policies advocated by the populist right has 
thus become assimilated into their profile. However, the established Socialist or 
Social Democrat parties now face competition from Ecologist parties in mobilizing 
voters with universalistic values, and have even lost their New Left profile in some 
cases. Ecologist parties now exhibit the most clearly libertarian-universalistic profile 
in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and in Austria. The same is true of the Liberal 
Democrats in Britain and for the short-lived Liberal Forum in Austria.  
The results so far thus confirm the proposition that the issues put on the political 
agenda by the New Left and of the populist right constitute polar normative ideals. At 
the same time, the basic structure of political space is similar whether or not a right-
wing populist party has established itself. This is due to the divisions over cultural 
liberalism on the one hand, and to the emergence of the immigration issue as a 
counter-pole to cultural liberalism in all cases except for Britain. Yet, even if the 
Dutch VVD and the German Union parties showed some reluctance concerning 
libertarian universalism and favoured tough immigration policies in the mid-1990s, 
neither of them qualifies as a member of the right-wing populist party family. Clearly, 
they lack the anti-establishment discourse typical of the populist right and have 
retained a pluralist party organization. And there is an important further difference: 
Because the populist right thrives on the hard core of the traditionalist-communitarian 
voter potential, it will scarcely survive a moderation of its discourse. Mainstream 
parties of the right, on the other hand, have more leeway to abandon those elements of 
the populist right’s discourse they adopted either to outbid their mainstream right 
competitors, or to crowd out extreme right-wing populist parties. The discussion over 
immigration and asylum seekers was there to grasp in the 1990s and this therefore 
constituted a crucial phase with long-term implications. The hypothesis that the nature 
of cultural conflicts differs depending on whether or not a right-wing populist party 
succeeded in breaking into party systems is verified in the most recent electoral 
contest. 
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The latest elections covered by the campaign data took place roughly twelve years 
after those just discussed, and almost twenty in the case of France due to the length of 
presidential terms. As before, I start with the discussion of the Austrian, Swiss and 
French cases, presented in Figure 5. Conforming to expectations, party positions 
remain polarized along the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian 
dimension in those countries where a right-wing populist party is present. In 
Switzerland, the declining salience of the European integration issue makes the Swiss 
configuration come to resemble that of the other two countries. This is largely the 
result of the Ecologists having converged on the pro-European position typical of 
New Left voters in continental Europe (though not in Scandinavia, see Bornschier 
forthcoming b). In each of the three countries, the cultural divide cuts across the state-
market cleavage very clearly, indicating that party positions along the two dimensions 
are not strongly related.  
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
In Austria, the FPÖ under the leadership of Hans-Christian Strache occupies a 
much more unambiguously traditionalist-communitarian position than Haider’s new 
party, the “Alliance for the Future of Austria” (BZÖ). The latter’s position in this 
election is no longer typical of successful right-wing populist parties, which may well 
explain its meagre electoral showing. Another new party, the “List Dr. Martin” seems 
to mobilize outside the dominant dimensions of opposition with its calls for political 
transparency, democracy, and justice. Compared to earlier contests, the ÖVP has 
changed its strategy vis-à-vis its right-wing populist competitors, and has come to 
occupy a more universalistic position. The ÖVP is less supportive of cultural 
liberalism than the SPÖ and much less so than the Ecologists, however, and its 
somewhat unexpected location is due its position on Europe (see Appendix). In a 
campaign in which debates over Europe centred on Turkey’s accession to the Union, 
the ÖVP remained the only party supportive of the integration process.  
In France, the Front National retains a distinctive position at the traditionalist-
communitarian pole of the cultural divide. The most interesting evolution here 
concerns the mainstream parties, whose positions have evolved considerably. In 
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particular, it is striking to which degree the Socialists have backed off from their New 
Left position under Ségolène Royal’s candidacy. The mainstream left is only 
moderately more in favour of cultural liberalism than the Gaullists, and takes an 
intermediate stance on immigration. Nicholas Sarkozy as the Gaullist candidate took a 
somewhat tougher stance on immigration than Royal, and this is even more true of 
Bayrou’s UDF, as the proximity figures reveal (see Appendix). This is not mirrored in 
Figure 5 due to the Royal’s strong endorsement of environmental protection, 
however. For the same reason, the configuration resulting from the MDS analysis 
does not do justice to the fact that the Ecologists by far retain the most libertarian-
universalistic profile. Despite these limitations, it is safe to say that, contrary to 
widespread perceptions, Sarkozy has not moved the Gaullist UMP dramatically closer 
to the populist right than was the case in 1988. Rather, 2002 was the exception, when 
Jacques Chirac defended an unusually universalistic position (see Bornschier 2008), 
and in this sense, Sarkozy did perform a turnaround. This implies, however, that the 
large number of former Front National voters that deserted Le Pen in favour of 
Sarkozy (see Mayer 2007) were not driven by the conviction that the mainstream right 
had adopted the Front National’s profile. Rather, they seem to have done to because 
of the personal characteristics and the credibility of the Gaullist candidate. 
Turning to the three countries that have not seen a breakthrough of a party of the 
populist right, Figure 6 reveals two different patterns: The first is the British 
trajectory, which follows a development found much earlier in the other countries, 
while the second is that of the Netherlands and Germany, where cultural conflicts 
have lost some of their virulence. Later than conservative or liberal parties in 
Germany and the Netherlands, the British Conservatives have put the immigration 
issue on the political agenda in the 2005 campaign. As a consequence, the British 
political space displays a cultural conflict that centres more explicitly on differing 
conceptions of community than was the case earlier on. The Conservatives are 
situated at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide, and while 
Labour’s position is somewhat indeterminate, the Liberal Democrats occupy the 
libertarian-universalistic pole. A partial integration of the two divides is evident, but 
the political space is clearly more than one-dimensional: What sets the Liberal 
Democrats and the other two parties apart is not so much their position with respect to 
the economic dimension, but the cultural conflict.  
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Figure 6 about here 
 
In the 1990s, the Christian Democratic Union parties in Germany exhibited a 
traditionalist-communitarian profile similar to that of the British Conservatives in 
2005. This move it proved transitory, however, as the German configuration in 2005 
reveals. The Asylum compromise between the Union parties and the SPD ousted the 
immigration issue from the political agenda, and no party campaigned on restrictive 
migration policies in 2005. With no competitor that keeps the anti-universalistic and 
anti-immigrant discourse alive, the Union parties were free to adopt a centrist position 
along the cultural line of conflict. As a result, party positions are no longer strongly 
structured by the cultural dimension. Rather, the competition within the left sparked 
off by the countrywide appeal of the newly founded Left Party has led to a stronger 
polarization in terms of economic policy making.(6) 
Finally, in the Netherlands a successful right-wing populist party is also absent. 
The List Pim Fortuyn did compete in this election, but it received almost no media 
coverage. More importantly, due to Fortuyn’s adherence to universalistic values, the 
LPF’s programmatic position in earlier elections differed significantly from that of 
right-wing populist parties. This finding emerges both from an analysis based on the 
media data also employed in this article (Bornschier forthcoming a), as well as in 
Pennings and Keman’s (2003) analysis based on manifesto data. Geert Wilders’ 
Freedom Party may qualify as a member of the extreme right-wing populist party 
family, but again, it has not received sufficient media coverage in order to locate it in 
political space. At first sight, the Dutch configuration is peculiar in that cultural 
liberalism and anti-immigration stances do not form a dimension, but are both situated 
above the state-market divide. This is due to all parties, with the exception of the 
VVD, rejecting tough immigration policies. Even the VVD has tempered its position 
compared to its firm anti-immigrant stance throughout the 1990s. Parties differ in 
significant ways with respect to cultural liberalism, however. In conjuncture with the 
lack of differentiation regarding immigration policies, this explains the somewhat 
unusual location of the immigration category. PvdA, SP and VVD subscribe to the 
universalistic principles embodied in the cultural liberalism category, while the 
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Christian Democrat CDA opposes them (the D66 has received insufficient coverage 
in the media to determine its position). In other words, none of the mayor parties 
exhibits a consistently traditionalist-communitarian position.  
Party positions along the state-market dimension differ more, on the other hand. 
While the VVD remains the most market liberal party, the CDA took a similarly free-
market position in this election. But the main dynamic takes place on the political left: 
Despite the PvdA remaining firmly anchored on the left, the Socialist Party (SP) 
opposes economic liberalism even more fervently. GroenLinks (GL) is situated 
similarly, but differs in its emphasis, above all opposing budgetary rigor. Just like in 
Germany, the absence of a right-wing populist party seems have resulted in the state-
market dimension regaining importance in the most recent Dutch elections, in which 
the Socialist Party more than doubled its voter share. In Germany, the decline of 
cultural conflicts results from the deliberate strategies of the established left and right, 
involving a polarization to crowd out the extreme right whenever the immigration 
issue emerged, but centripetal competition whenever it was off the agenda (see 
Bornschier forthcoming a). In the Netherlands, the major parties also colluded after 
the success of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (see Kriesi and Frey 2008), but the inability of a 
right-wing populist party to entrench itself also seems to result from the failures of 
these parties themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
Covering thirty years of party politics in six West European countries, the findings 
presented in this article clearly reject the hypothesis that politics after the decline of 
the historical cleavages is shaped by rapidly evolving issue agendas and populism. 
Rather, the transformation witnessed by these party systems within the last three 
decades reflect, first, the rising diffusion of universalistic values since the 1960s, 
resulting in societal changes that have triggered a first redrawing of political space. 
Secondly, these transformations carry the imprint of a – delayed – traditionalist-
communitarian counter-reaction against this development. The New Left and the 
extreme populist right, the two party families that are both the driving forces and the 
product of this two-fold transformation of political space, lie at opposing poles of the 
new cultural divide opposing libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-
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communitarian values. With the state-market divide retaining much of its power, the 
space of West European politics is clearly two-dimensional. New data from recent 
elections show that, even if the two dimensions coincide to varying degrees from 
election to election, economic and cultural divides have not been merged into a single 
dimension of conflict.  
At the same time, to which degree the two dimensions polarize party systems 
depends on the strategies of the political parties composing them. Where a right-wing 
populist party was able to assert itself in the crucial years of the 1990s, the divide 
between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of 
community remained vibrant. Far from being single-issue parties, right-wing populist 
parties in France, Switzerland, and Austria – as well as elsewhere in Europe – have 
succeeded in creating a comprehensive traditionalist-nationalist political subculture 
that leads its adherents to interpret politics in cultural, and not in economic terms (see 
also Bornschier forthcoming a). Similarly, where an established party of the right has 
undergone a transformation into a right-wing populist party, as in the case of the 
Swiss SVP or the Austrian FPÖ, it is unlikely that the split within the right should be 
reversible. After all, these parties have gained substantial voter shares by politicizing 
the new cultural conflict, and by placing renewed emphasis on economic policy 
making or other political issues, they would only play into the hands of their 
mainstream competitors.  
In Germany and in the Netherlands, on the other hand, established right-wing 
parties have catered the immigration issue only temporarily. In conjuncture with the 
mainstream left not engaging in a strongly adversarial strategy implying a strong 
endorsement of multiculturalism against their right-wing competitors, no right-wing 
populist party was able to institutionalize. As a consequence, the established right was 
free to back off from its harsh anti-immigrant stances. Cultural conflicts therefore 
centre on libertarian-universalistic values and manifest themselves in tempered form 
in the mid-2000s. This account nuances the assertion that the convergence of the 
mainstream parties fosters, while a mainstream right party that leaves little room to its 
right limits the success of the populist right (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Abedi 
2002, Luebbers et al. 2002, Carter 2005). Crowding out the populist right occurs as a 
conjuncture of the established right temporarily taking a tough stance on immigration, 
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and the established left avoiding ideological stretching, thereby downplaying the 
immigration issue. My account is thus more in line with Meguid’s (2005) approach. 
Partly as a consequence of the decline of the cultural conflict, economic issues 
have proven more important in structuring recent party divisions in Germany and the 
Netherlands, and have given rise to significant parties off the left-wing mainstream. 
Given the fact that the modernization processes of the past decades have been both 
economic and cultural, and have created “winners” and “losers” in both terms, this is 
hardly surprising. So far, however, party systems with firmly entrenched right-wing 
populist parties have escaped this dynamic, and it is likely that politics will continue 
to evolve in a path-dependent manner in the two contexts. It is too early to judge 
which of the two camps Britain is likely to adhere to in the future. The Conservatives 
have put harsher immigration stances on the political agenda and have also mobilized 
widespread Eurosceptic sentiments, but the absence of a right-wing competitor leaves 
either of the two routes open to them – that followed by the Union parties in Germany 
or the one chosen by the Swiss People’s Party. 
 
 
Notes 
 
(1) I would like to thank the participants of the second phase of the research project 
“National political change in a globalizing world”, namely, Marc Helbling, Dominic 
Höglinger, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Bruno Wüescht in Zurich, as well as Martin 
Dolezal, Swen Hutter, and Edgar Grande in Munich, for sharing their new data with 
me. Special thanks goes to Bruno Wüescht for his help in preparing the data. 
Furthermore, I thank Kevin Deegan-Krause and Zsolt Enyedi, as well as two 
anonymous reviewers for their most valuable comments and suggestions. It goes 
without saying that I exempt them from the responsibility of any remaining errors. 
 
(2) Extreme right-wing populist parties from the 1990s on can be distinguished from 
other parties by virtue of three commonalities: (i) a location at the traditionalist-
communitarian extreme of the new cultural divide; (ii) a populist anti-establishment 
discourse, in which they draw a dividing line between themselves and the established 
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parties, and (iii) a hierarchical internal structure which sets them apart from pluralist 
parties. It is only for the sake of brevity that I occasionally drop the label “extreme” in 
identifying these parties.  
 
(3) Following Kitschelt’s (1994) as well as Flanagan and Lee’s (2003) usage, I use the 
term “libertarian” to denote a culturally liberal position compatible with an 
interventionist state, and not as an all-embracing call for a minimal state, as in 
Nozick’s (1974) conception.  
 
(4) While some of the New Social Movements of the left have also showed affinities 
to communitarian thinking, their conception of community emphasizes individual 
autonomy based on universalistic values, and thus refers to quite different strands of 
communitarian thought than those outlined here. 
 
(5) The earliest time-point for France is 1988 because presidential elections there are 
less frequent than the parliamentary ones analyzed in the other cases. This turns out 
be fortunate due to the country’s role as a forerunner of the developments found later 
in other countries. 
 
(6) The position of the Free Democrats (FDP) in terms of the state-market cleavage is 
unexpected and due to their strong advocacy of budgetary rigor. The latter’s location, 
in turn, is due to the fact that budgetary rigor was more strongly endorsed by the SPD 
and Ecologists than by the Union parties in this election. Because the Left Party did 
not strongly advocate its reservations regarding budgetary rigor, it is (misleadingly) 
located close to the “budget” category (see explanations in the research design 
section). 
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Figure 3: Political Space in Austria, Switzerland, and France 
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Figure 4: Political Space in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, 1990s 
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Figure 5: Political Space in Austria, Switzerland, and France, 2000s 
6 
 
Figure 6: Political Space in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, 2000s 
 
 
